role of reluctance to give up life in the measurement of the value of health states.
In practice, what will be maximized when costutility analysis is applied is the &dquo;utility&dquo; assigned to health interventions by the chosen metric. Should such life-and-death decisions be based on the results of a particular assessment procedure? The measurability of utility has been one of the raging debates of the economic world for many years, giving caution to those who would claim that application of any one metric can solve our dilemmas about health care rationing. We still may be willing to employ some assessment procedure as a guide, so long as that procedure is perceived as fair and representative of our basic principles. At the very least, it must be free of systematic bias that runs counter to those principles. The techniques most commonly used for assigning values to intermediate health states, time trade-off and category scaling, do not meet these criteria. The results of time trade-off assessments are generally used without a correction for decreasing marginal utility for life years.
This will tend to overestimate the disutilities of minor impairments relative to more serious impairments, thus giving greater priority to those already better off.'' Categorical scaling appears to be even more problematic in this regard 5
In any rationing scheme, resources are denied to some so that others may benefit. One of the central problems in rationing is the aggregation problem': how may patients need to be relieved of moderate angina, for example, to make us willing to forgo restoring sight to one blind person? We might trust our intuition when comparing two interventions that improve quality of life, but we will have difficulty making this determination when we pit improvements in quality of life against life-saving interventions. The QALY approach claims to be able to solve the aggregation problem by measuring the utilities of intermediate health states in isolation, and then comparing the results.
Assume, for example, that moderate angina is assigned a quality-adjustment factor of 0.8 (with perfect health assigned a value of 1). If the time trade-off had been used as the assessment tool, this would indicate that someone faced with living for ten years with moderate angina would be willing to shorten his or her life span to eight years if those years could be spent in perfect health. Assuming that blindness is assigned a value of 0.4, then the utility gained by restoring sight to a blind person (0.6) appears to be three times the utility gained by relieving moderate angina (0.2). Nord's objection is that these assessments were made independently of each other, without trade-offs in mind, but cost-utility analysis would use these data to establish that relieving three patients of moderate angina is equal in value to restoring the sight of one. These data would also establish that relieving five patients of moderate angina is equal in value to saving one life. The persontrade-off approach simply asks for these equivalence numbers directly. One reason for the appeal of the indirect QALY approach is the difficulty we have in coming up with direct answers to these aggregation questions. But the controversial nature of the philosophy of utilitarianism as well as doubts about the measurability (or even existence) of utility should make us quite uneasy about using the QALY approach alone, without employing other approaches to validate the results. The person-trade-off approach might be used to develop adjustment algorithms that will allow conversion of QALY data to a scale that better matches our intuitions and principles.',' The technique might also be used, as presented here, to generate empirical data on general aspects of preferences regarding health care resource allocation. More experience will be needed before we can tell whether it will be useful in these roles. As Nord points out, it is demanding and subject to considerable random error, as well as the framing effects that are evident with utility assessment techniques in general. It remains to be seen whether the person-trade-off approach will yield coherent results, i.e., whether the equivalence number obtained by direct comparison of Intervention A and Intervention C is reasonably close to the calculated equivalence number derived by multiplying the results generated by separate comparisons between Interventions A and B, and Interventions B and C. If not, perhaps we will have to conclude that our intuitions about these trade-offs are not developed enough for direct assessment to be useful.
As pressures to control health care costs mount, the fee-for-service payment system is giving way to a capitation system, in which physicians potentially incur financial losses if they do not limit spending. This is likely to lead to restrictions in the services provided, effectively placing rationing decisions in the hands of physicians. Providers who have traditionally considered only the welfare of the individual patient being treated will now have to weigh the relative claims to resources of different patients. To do this fairly, physicians will need to know more about the relative values society places on different health care interventions. The person-trade-off technique deserves consideration as a complement to the QALY approach to generating the necessary data, but more experience
